grade bonds behave more like Treasuries, and are driven mostly by term-structure factors. Hence, it may not be surprising that structural models have not been overly successful in this bond segment. On the other hand, low-grade bonds behave more like equities and respond rather strongly to changes in macro and firm-level conditions.
The asymmetry in explanatory power could also emerge because structural models are intended to explain default risk, which represents a much larger proportion of the credit spread among low-grade bonds. While this point has been less emphasized in previous work on corporate bonds, it finds support in recent work by Huang and Huang (2003) , who show that among high-grade bonds the credit risk component accounts for only a small fraction of the overall credit spread.
The presence of a strong latent factor in the unexplained credit spread variation is also a high-grade bond phenomenon. Applying principal component analysis to the universe of low-grade bonds, as well as to the entire sample of 2,375 corporate bonds, reveals no dominant latent factor in the variation unexplained by structural model variables. These new findings suggest that high-and low-grade bonds may be subject to different demand/supply forces. In practice, the demand for high-grade bonds is governed by large institutional players such as pension funds and insurance companies that typically trade high-quality bonds. For example, Hong and Warga (2000) report that insurance companies account for roughly 40% of the market for investment-grade debt. Such concentration of large institutional players could induce a bond-related demand factor. In contrast, the low-grade bond segment involves a less concentrated set of players including high-yield mutual funds, hedge funds, and speculators pursuing short-term profits. As a result, common demand shocks are less likely to occur.
Our paper develops further evidence on the viability of structural models in empirical corporate bond pricing. Building on recent innovations in asset pricing, we identify two variables -idiosyncratic volatility and the price-to-book ratio -which appear to have a strong basis in a structural model framework. Specifically, Campbell and Taksler (2003) document a synchronous upward trend in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility and aggregate credit spreads. Moreover, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that the price-to-book ratio and idiosyncratic volatility are both driven by uncertainty about the firm's future profitability. Since future profitability affects default probability in a structural model framework, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) establish a link between credit spreads, idiosyncratic volatility, and the price-to-book ratio. Our evidence shows that idiosyncratic volatility and the price-to-book ratio, both at the aggregate and firm level, are economically and statistically significant in explaining both cross-sectional differences in credit spread changes, as well as the time-series variation in corporate credit spread changes. Our findings indicate that these variables should be considered along with more traditional ones in studies of credit risk at the individual bond level.
The explanatory power of the new set of structural model determinants is then evaluated against that of the Fama and French (1993) factors. The Fama-French factors have traditionally been used in equity pricing. Recently, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) document that these factors capture the systematic variation in credit spreads. As in Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), we find that the Fama-French factors alone explain about 26% of the variation in credit spread changes. Yet when added to our set of structural model variables, the Fama-French factors lose significance and do not increase the overall explanatory power. This suggests that structural model factors capture the systematic risk in credit spread changes better than the FamaFrench factors. Our findings confirm empirically the theoretical predictions of Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) , who develop a general equilibrium paradigm to show that accounting for growth opportunities, as our structural variables do, explains the size and value effects in expected asset returns.
It should be noted that our sample period, 1990 to 2003, has witnessed many central bank actions that respond to major credit events. Fed easing could lead to tightening credit spreads, as is actually observed in the early 1990s. Likewise, the widening spreads in 2000-2001 are at least in part due to a shortage of Treasuries and the 'flight-to-quality'. To control for the extent of liquidity in the economy and its effect on credit spreads, we construct an indicator variable for the Fed easing and tightening cycles. We find that our set of results is robust to such liquidity 4 We thank Suresh Sundaresan for pointing out this issue.
considerations. In fact, the dummy variable is insignificant in the middle-and low-grade credit risk terciles. Among the high-grade bond tercile, expansionary (contractionary) Fed policy significantly reduces (increases) credit spreads. This reinforces our previous observation that investment-grade bonds are viewed by investors as substitutes to Treasuries.
In summary, we find structural models to be robust in explaining corporate credit spreads, especially in the low-grade segment. First, for the entire sample of 2,375 corporate bonds, structural model variables explain 53% of the total variation in credit spread changes, and they capture the explanatory power of the Fama-French factors. Second, we show that firm-level variables, important drivers of credit spreads in a structural model framework, play an important role in explaining corporate credit spread changes. Third, newly introduced variables, which are inspired by recent innovations in asset pricing and which have a strong basis in a structural model framework, do indeed a good job in explaining credit spread changes. Fourth, we find no single latent factor unrelated to structural models that dominates the unexplained variation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the list of explanatory variables considered here and provides an economic appeal for their inclusion. Section 2 explains the data used in the empirical analysis. The results are discussed in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
Credit Spread Changes: Potential Determinants
Our determinants of credit spread changes are inspired by structural models of default risk. Structural models undertake the contingent claim approach, viewing equity and debt as options on the firm value. Under structural models, default occurs when the firm-value process hits a default threshold. These models imply that variables governing the firm-value process affect default probabilities and default recovery rates and thus ultimately drive credit spreads. Whether such models are empirically successful has long been an open question. True, one of the most popular and commercially successful systems for evaluating default risk, Moody's/KMV's expected default frequency (EDF) methodology, as well as their recent RiskCalc credit scoring system, are based on Merton's model.
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Even so, the academic literature has been inconclusive regarding the performance of structural models. On the one hand, Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) and Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) find that structural model variables explain only a small fraction of credit risk. Likewise, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) do not find structural models to be promising in motivating variables that adequately explain credit spread changes. On the other hand, Campbell and Taksler (2003) document strong co-movement between aggregate bond spreads and an aggregate measure of idiosyncratic volatility. This co-movement provides support for structural models because such models motivate firm volatility as a primary driver of a bond's default probability.
It should be noted that in this work we do not formally implement a structural model framework to evaluate model ability to fit prices or spreads. Instead, within a linear time series regression specification, we assess the relevance of structural models to inspire variables that are robust in explaining the movements in corporate credit spreads.
Structural model variables typically include economy-wide interest rates, termstructure slope, market return, market volatility, as well as firm-level leverage and volatility. Relative to previously studied variables, we incorporate firm-level and aggregate values of idiosyncratic volatility and growth prospects, as well as stock return momentum. The entire set of selected variables and the way they relate to the probability of default and the recovery rate conditional on default are described as follows:
Idiosyncratic volatility. The contingent-claim approach views debt as a combination of a risk-free loan and a short put option on the firm. Higher volatility increases the option value, thereby decreasing bond prices and increasing spreads. Intuitively, higher volatility increases the likelihood of hitting the default threshold. Structural models posit that firm value is driven by the firm's total volatility, which has previously been proxied by market volatility. We focus on the idiosyncratic volatility component following Campbell and Taksler (2003) who document a synchronous upward move in aggregate spreads and aggregate idiosyncratic volatility during 1990 to 2000. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document that both idiosyncratic and total volatility have strongly moved upward in the past decade, while market volatility has remained constant over that period. We study the effect of changes in both aggregate and firm-level idiosyncratic volatility on credit spread changes.
Stock return momentum. Empirical research has extensively documented that the cross-section of equity returns is predictable based on past returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that past winners continue to outperform past losers over the short-to-medium horizon, generating 'momentum' in stock prices. Thus higher momentum in equity returns implies higher future firm valuation, and could potentially imply lower probability of default and lower spreads.
Growth opportunities. Improving prospects of firm growth and profitability decrease the likelihood that the firm-value process hits the default threshold. We use the market-to-book ratio to proxy for future profitability following Pastor and Veronesi (2003) who provide theoretical proof and empirical evidence that the firm's market-tobook ratio increases with expected profitability. We study the effect of changes in both aggregate and firm-level market-to-book ratios on individual credit spread changes.
Spot rate. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue that an increase in the spot rate increases the risk-neutral drift of the firm-value process and reduces the probability of the firm value falling below the default threshold. This spot-rate credit spread relation has been confirmed empirically in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Duffee (1998).
Term-structure slope. We consider two competing hypotheses of the directional impact of changes in the term-structure slope on credit spread changes. On the one hand, a steepening of the term-structure slope implies an increase in expected future spot rates (risk-neutral drift), thereby reducing credit spreads. In addition, Fama and French (1989) argue that an increase in the yield curve slope leads to an improving economy, improving recovery rates, and decreasing credit risk. On the other hand, the increase in expected future interest rates, implied by a steepening yield curve, may reduce the number of positive NPV projects available to the firm. This, in turn, leads to a lower firm valuation and an increase in spreads. The ultimate impact of changes in the term-structure slope on credit spread changes is thus an empirical question.
Leverage. Merton (1974) implies that high leverage should increase the probability of default, because it raises the default threshold. We use equity return as a measure of change in the firm's leverage, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) .
Market conditions. Even with constant default probability, changes in credit spreads are affected by changes in expected recovery rates. Since the expected recovery rate is a function of the overall business climate (see, e.g., Altman and Kishore (1996) ), an improving economy should drive credit spreads down. We use equity market returns to proxy for changes in business climate, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Data
We obtain bond and stock data from Datastream. The stock data is used to construct our firm-level variables, as described below. Our sample includes all US corporate bonds listed on Datastream, which satisfy a set of selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature. Extracting all US corporate bonds from Datastream between September 1990 (the first available date for corporate bonds) and January 2003 yields 8,892 bond issues. The bond and equity datasets are then matched using the bond's unique identifier. This initial sample is subject to the following filtering criteria:
• We exclude bonds with no corresponding equity data in Datastream.
• We remove all bonds with equity or derivative features, such as callable, puttable, and convertible bonds, and bonds with warrants.
• We remove bonds with floating interest rates.
• For a bond to be in the sample, we require at least 25 consecutive monthly observations, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) .
• We also remove all bonds for which the credit spread data appears to be problematic. For example, a problematic bond record may indicate a negative credit spread due to an incorrect Treasury yield curve assignment. In addition, credit spreads exceeding 13% are considered outliers and are thus removed.
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Extreme spreads can be attributed either to data errors or to credit spread blow-ups.
7
The filtered sample contains 2,375 fixed-rate straight US corporate bonds issued by 678 firms. The average number of monthly credit spread observations per bond is 47. It is important to note that our dataset addresses potential survivorship bias issues, as we have not excluded bonds that have gone bankrupt or that have expired.
For all selected bonds, we extract all end-of-month credit spreads available in Datastream over the period September 1990 to January 2003. Credit spreads are computed as the yield differential between the bond and the Treasury curve, taking into account maturity and compounding frequency:
where Y ield i,t is the t-period yield on corporate bond i and Y ield CU RV E,t is the yield on a t-period Treasury bond.
We also extract from Datastream issue-specific information, such as issue date, maturity date, time-to-maturity, duration, type of bond, embedded options, international identifier, and the corresponding equity-level information. This information is used for initial filtering and the formation of aggregate and firm-level variables.
6 We only remove the period over which the spread exceeds the limit, not the entire bond, to avoid introducing survivorship bias in the sample. The 13% figure reflects five standard deviations away from the mean.
7 Credit blow-ups usually result from defaulted investment-grade credits, which are then relegated to junk-bond status. In this situation the credit spread can jump from a few hundred to tens of thousands basis points. The distressed high-grade companies are usually referred to as "fallen angels". Moreover, the standard deviation of credit spread changes averages 0.17% in the lowrisk tercile, while it is 0.77% in the high-risk tercile. The differences in the volatility of credit spread changes in the different risk groups are also underscored by the range of credit spread changes, which is much larger for the high-risk tercile. The mean credit spread change substantially differs across the credit risk groups. Low credit risk bonds have a mean credit spread change of zero, average credit risk bonds have a mean credit spread change of one basis point per month, while high credit risk bonds average six basis points credit spread increase per month. While our sample contains a variety of short-and long-term bonds, we do not observe a clear relationship between duration/time-to-maturity and credit risk. The average duration of the bonds in our sample is 5.16 years and the average time-to-maturity is 8.69 years.
In Table 1 and in part of the empirical analysis that follows, we form credit risk groups based on the bond's credit spread level. Ideally, one would form such groups using the bond rating. However, Datastream does not provide the rating for many bonds included in our sample. Many bonds are not even rated by any agency.
Intuitively, a higher credit spread reflects a higher credit risk. To verify this, for the bonds having an S&P rating in Datastream, we compute the average credit rating for each of the credit risk groups.
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The last two rows in Table 1 report, respectively, the numeric and alphabetic credit rating for the three credit spread groups. The average rating is A for the highest-grade tercile, BBB+ for the middle-grade tercile, and BB-for the lowest-grade tercile. This strong monotonic relationship between credit spread level and credit rating justifies our use of credit spread level as a proxy for credit rating.
Our high credit risk group contains mostly high-yield bonds that have been excluded in previous studies of credit spread changes.
Firm-Level Variables
Firm-level variables are based on issuer equity data. Monthly stock returns and priceto-book ratios are obtained directly from Datastream. Following Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), we construct stock return momentum as the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning of the previous month. This variable excludes the preceding month's return to avoid spurious association between prior and current returns due to thin trading or/and bid-ask spread effects.
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Monthly volatilities are calculated as the sum of squared daily returns over the trading days of the month. Firm-level idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the difference between monthly market volatility and monthly total firm-level volatility, as in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) . Since our analysis focuses on the determinants of changes in corporate credit spreads, we use changes in volatility and price-to-book ratios.
Aggregate Variables
Market-wide measures for aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, aggregate price-to-book ratio, and equity market return are calculated as equally-weighted averages across all 678 stocks in the sample. Spot rates are represented by the monthly series of two-, five-, ten-, and thirty-year Merrill Lynch Government bond yield indexes. We use one index at a time in our regressions, since changes in these indexes are highly correlated; correlations range between 0.73 and 0.95 (see Table 2 ). Changes in the five-and tenyear yield indexes exhibit the highest correlation with credit spread changes (-0.86).
These changes are expected to be the most important drivers of credit spread changes as the average duration and time-to-maturity of the bonds in our sample are 5.16 and 8.69 years, respectively (see Table 1 ). The term-structure slope is measured as the yield differential between any two of the two-, five-, ten-, and thirty-year Merrill Lynch Government bond indexes. Except for equity market returns, we use changes, rather than levels, in the aggregate variables described above. Table 2 shows that the correlation between the changes in these series is about the same (-0.86), suggesting that increases in interest rates significantly reduce the default probability of a typical firm.
Results

Credit Spreads over the Period 1990-2003: An Overview
Firm-Level Variables and the Cross-Section of Credit Spread Changes
We examine the power of firm-level fundamentals to explain cross-sectional differences in credit spread changes unexplained by common factors. Theoretically, structural models posit that default occurs when the firm-value process reaches some default threshold, suggesting that firm-level fundamentals should be a driving force behind changes in the probability of default. Empirically, support for firm-level variables is implied by Kwan (1996) , who documents a strong firm-level relation between corporate yield and equity return. Since spreads are yields with a removed common interestrate component, Kwan (1996) 's findings may suggest a robust relation between credit spreads and firm-level fundamentals. Nonetheless, previous work has primarily studied aggregate determinants of credit spread changes.
The cross-sectional analysis employs the methodology of Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998).
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For each bond in our sample, we run the time-series regres-
where ∆S it is bond i's credit spread change from time t-1 to time t, F t is a K ×1 vector of common factors realized at time t, and β i is the K × 1 vector of factor sensitivities.
Then, for each month in our sample, we run the cross-sectional regression
where
it is the vector of firm-level attributes, and α i , β i and it are the corresponding estimates from regression (2). Notice that ∆S * it is the credit spread change unexplained by common factors. The standard errors of b t in (3), used to compute the t-ratios, are obtained from the time-series of monthly estimates, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) . Table 3 reports the results from the cross-sectional regressions. Panel A describes the case where the three Fama and French (1993) factors are used to explain common variation. In Panel B, we replace the Fama-French factors by structural model factors, which include equity market returns and changes in the aggregate price-to-book ratio, aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, interest rates, and term-structure slopes.
The first row in panels A and B displays the results when all bonds are included in the analysis. Observe from Panel A that when the three Fama and French (1993) factors are used, firm-level leverage (proxied by stock returns) and momentum are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in credit spread changes. In contrast, changes idiosyncratic volatility and growth prospects (the latter is proxied by the price-tobook ratio) are insignificant at conventional levels. In Panel B, when the structural model factors are used to explain common variation, changes in idiosyncratic volatility and price-to-book ratio are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in credit spread changes at the 10% level.
We repeat the analysis excluding bonds with less than two years to maturity.
Credit spreads on short maturity bonds could be less sensitive to evolving firm fundamentals. The results are reported in the second row of panels A and B in Table 3 . Based on both panels, changes in idiosyncratic volatility are now strongly significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in credit spread changes. Variations in stock returns and momentum remain significant, whereas variations in price-to-book ratios become insignificant. The evidence shows the economic significance of firm-level fundamentals. For one, decreasing leverage (reflected by positive returns), positive momentum, and decreasing idiosyncratic volatility, are associated cross-sectionally with decreasing spreads. Specifically, Panel B (second row) shows that a firm with a one percent higher monthly return is expected to have a 12 basis points lower credit spread. Next, the coefficient on the momentum variable suggests that a one percent higher return over the past two months leads to eight basis points lower spreads. Finally, a 1% increase in monthly idiosyncratic volatility leads to 26 basis points higher spreads.
Overall, the analysis supports the importance of firm-level attributes, including those newly introduced here, in explaining the cross-section of credit spread changes left unexplained by common factors. This leads us to the next step in the analysis, where we examine the extent to which changes in firm-level fundamentals in conjunction with aggregate factors explain the time-series variation in credit spread changes.
Determinants of the Time-Series Variation of Credit Spread Changes
We start by examining the time-series explanatory power of common factors and firmlevel attributes across all 2,375 corporate bonds in our sample. Throughout the timeseries analysis, we run individual bond regressions, then average the estimated coefficients across all bonds and report the average values.
To assess the relative importance of each variable, we first present in Table 4 results from univariate regressions of credit spread changes on individual common fac- Specifically, changes in spot rates seem to have the strongest impact on credit spread changes both in terms of significance and explanatory power. Consistent with the theoretical implications of risk-neutral contingent-claim pricing, increasing spot rates lead to decreasing credit spreads. Changes in 5-year spot rates alone explain 28.63% of the variation in individual credit spread changes. While the 2-, 10-, and 30-year spot rates have a similar degree of significance and explanatory power, the slight relative advantage of the 5-year rates may be due to the average bond duration of 5.16 years. Changes in the term-structure slope are also important determinants of corporate credit spread changes. Changes in the long-term slope have a strong positive impact on credit spread changes, consistent with the hypothesis that an increasing slope decreases the expected NPV of available projects, and thus reduces firm value and increases credit spreads. Changes between 30-and 10-year yields (30Y-10Y) explain 17.7% (t-statistic = 42.60) of individual spread changes. The highest explanatory power of this slope could be due to its correspondence to the period when the refinancing needs (and new projects decisions) of a typical firm occur. In contrast, an increase in the short-end of the term-structure slope (5Y-2Y) reduces credit spreads, consistent with the hypothesis that an increasing slope implies an improving economy, which leads to a credit risk decline.
Equity market return seems to be the second strongest determinant of credit risk changes, explaining 18.25% (t-statistic = -36.26) of the variation. In line with the findings of Campbell and Taksler (2003) , changes in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility have a strong positive impact on credit spread changes at the individual bond level (t-statistic = 32.25) and explain on average 6.47% of the time-series variation in credit spread changes. Next, an increase in the price-to-book (PB) ratio, indicating improving growth opportunities, reduces credit spreads. The PB ratio accounts on average for 3.21% (t-statistic = -34.88) of the variation in credit spread changes. Table 4 summarizes the relative importance of each firm-level characteristic. Each of the firm-level variables is significant and has the theoretically expected sign (the momentum variable is significant at the 10%). As posited by structural models, changes in firm leverage (proxied by stock returns) and firm-level idiosyncratic volatility are the most important drivers of credit spread changes. Positive stock returns (a decrease in leverage) tend to decrease spreads significantly (t-statistic = 22.17), while increases in stock volatility tend to increase them significantly (t-statistic = 26.44).
Panel B in
Changes in firm leverage alone account for 15.45% of the variation in individual spread changes and changes in firm-level idiosyncratic volatility explain 13.20% of this variation. Bond spreads also respond to momentum in stock returns (Adj.-R 2 = 6.37%), but the t-statistic of -1.70 is significant only at the 10% level. 
where F t is the vector of common factors realized at time t, C it is the vector of firm-level characteristics at time t, and β 1i and β 2i are the vectors of sensitivities. Table 5 summarizes the results using five different specifications of regression (4) and provides a clear picture of the relative power of common and firm-level variables in explaining credit spread changes. Column M1 presents the combined explanatory power of the five common factors -equity market return and changes in the aggregate price-to-book ratio, aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, 5-year spot rate, and the term-structure slope corresponding to the yield differential between 30-and 10-year
Treasuries. These five common factors capture as much as 43.78% of the variation in credit spread changes. Changes in 5-year spot rates have the strongest impact on credit spread changes (t-statistic = -34.18), followed by changes in idiosyncratic volatility (t-statistic = 14.36). All aggregate variables, except for changes in the term-structure slope, are significant.
Column M2 presents the combined explanatory power of firm-level stock return, momentum, and changes in idiosyncratic volatility and the price-to-book ratio. To summarize, the time-series regression results provide strong empirical support for structural models. Common factors alone explain about 44% of the time variation in individual credit spread changes, while firm-level attributes alone explain 26%. Common factors and firm-level variables combined explain more than 53% of the variation in credit spread changes, a substantial improvement over previous findings.
Credit Spread Variation by Credit Risk Groups
The evidence thus far suggests that aggregate variables explain a substantial part of the variation in individual credit spread changes, much larger than previously documented.
The analysis also indicates a much larger role for firm fundamentals. We will show below that much of the sharp differences from related studies are attributable to the composition of bonds in our sample.
For the remainder of the analysis, the sample of 2,375 bonds is divided into three credit-risk terciles based on their credit spread level. (4) for each of the credit risk groups separately. The five panels in Table 6 report the results.
Strikingly, across all five regression specifications considered, the explained credit spread variation increases substantially as the bond credit risk increases (see last row
of Panels A to E in Table 6 ). The level of significance of both common and firmlevel variables also increases with credit risk. In particular, observe from Panel A in Table 6 that when only common factors are considered, the R-squared increases from 28.51% (low credit spread level) to 43.72% (average credit spread level) and to 53.67%
(high credit spread level). The significance of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility appears to increase as the credit-risk increases (the t-statistic increases from 2.54 to 2.71 to 6.61), as prescribed by structural models of default. The significance of changes in the aggregate price-to-book ratio, changes in interest rates, and equity market returns also increases with credit risk. The flip in sign of the term-structure change variable, in turn, indicates opposite effect on high-versus-low-grade bonds.
Panel B confirms that the explanatory power of firm-level attributes is more pronounced for the highest credit risk bonds. The R-squared increases from 18.56% to 28.37% moving from the low to the high credit risk group. Moreover, the significance of the firm characteristics is highest in the high-risk category, where all coefficients are strongly significant and with the theoretically motivated signs.
Panel C provides the most direct evidence for the differences between our results and previous results based on high-grade bonds. First, the time-series variation in credit spread changes explained by both common factors and firm-level attributes is substantially higher for low-versus-high grade bonds. In the low-risk category it is about half (34.96%) that in the high-risk category (67.14%). Second, firm-specific variables remain strongly significant when combined with common factors for the highrisk group, while they completely lose power in the low-risk group.
Indeed, this is a key finding in our analysis -the universe of low-grade bonds behaves substantially differently in the response of credit spread changes to changes in common factors and firm-level fundamentals. High-grade bonds behave more like Treasuries and are driven mostly by common term-structure factors and their response to firm-level fundamentals is virtually nonexistent. The segment of low-grade bonds displays substantial differences. Junk bonds behave more like equities and respond rather strongly to changes in both aggregate and firm-level variables.
Focusing on high-grade bonds, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) (2000) report that insurance companies account for roughly 40% of the market for investment-grade debt. Supply and demand shocks may indeed be driven by the actions of these large institutional players. To investigate whether such shocks are also pervasive in the lower credit risk segment of the market, we next examine the unexplained credit spread variation through an extensive principal component analysis.
Analysis of the Unexplained Credit Spread Variation
We implement principal component [PC] analysis on credit spread changes, as well as on the residuals of the time-series regressions, which reflect unexplained variation. The comparison between the two provides insights on the degree to which our variables have been successful in capturing the common variation in credit spread changes. The 2,375 corporate bond credit spread and regression residual series are each assigned into one of 35 portfolios formed as the interaction of five credit spread and seven time-to-maturity categories. PC analysis is applied to the portfolios rather than to individual bonds as bonds expire or default, and are therefore not available for the entire sample period. However, PC analysis applied to the regression residuals, after accounting for the five structural model factors, described in Table 5 Column M1, reveals an entirely different picture (see Figure 4 , column II, row 1). The first principal component accounts for only 28% of the variation in residuals and no longer stands out relative to the subsequent ones, suggesting that our five structural model factors have captured the major portion of the common variation in credit spread changes. PC analysis applied to the residuals from the time-series regressions on both aggregate and firm-level variables (see Table 5 , column M3) uncovers virtually identical latent factors (see Figure 4 , column II, row 2). This suggests that the firm-level variables do not proxy for common variation. Instead, they reflect a purely idiosyncratic component in the variation of credit risk changes.
Our PC analysis provides evidence that is apparently at odds with that of CollinDufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). Whereas we do not identify one common latent factor in the unexplained variation, they document that one latent factor, unrelated to structural models, captures about 75% of the common variation in the regression residuals, leading them to conclude that there is a strong bond factor related to shocks in demand and supply in bond markets. Below we describe two sources for this difference.
The first is the effect of portfolio grouping in PC analysis. As we show in the Appendix, portfolio formation spuriously increases the importance of latent factors.
Indeed, with a smaller number of 15 portfolios as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Martin (2001), our PC analysis of regression residuals reveals that one factor captures about 45% of the unexplained credit spread variation, still much lower than the 75% reported in previous work. Our large dataset allows us to form more portfolios (35), which reduces the seeming explanatory power of the latent factor to only 28% (see Figure 4 , second column).
The more important source for this difference relates to the composition of our bond sample. There is a much stronger common factor in the unexplained variation of high-grade bonds relative to that of low-grade bonds. This may indicate that the bond supply-and-demand factor is purely an investment-grade bond market phenomenon.
This assertion is supported by Figure 5 . The upper row displays the latent factors underlying the total spread variation and the unexplained variation in the low credit risk category. Indeed, there is a stronger latent factor in the unexplained variation of credit spread changes of high-grade bonds, capturing more than 50% of their common variation. The lower row shows that when high credit risk bonds are considered, a single latent factor no longer stands out and captures less than 30% of their unexplained common variation, even when the PC analysis is performed based on 15 portfolios because of the lower number of bonds within each credit risk group.
In sum, principal component analysis of the unexplained variation of high-versuslow-grade bond credit spread changes reinforces our regression results: high-grade and low-grade bonds behave substantially differently and seem to reflect two distinct markets dominated by different forces underlying the demand and supply curves. Specifically, the performance of structural models strongly depends upon the bond rating. For high-grade bonds, the explanatory power of structural model variables is limited to 35%, the role of firm-level fundamentals is virtually nonexistent, and a single latent factor explains much of the unexplained variation. High-grade bonds behave more like Treasuries and are driven mostly by term-structure factors. For lowgrade bonds, however, common and firm-level structural model variables explain 67% of the total variation in credit spread changes, and principal component analysis reveals no dominant latent factor in the unexplained variation. Low-grade bonds behave more like equities and respond rather strongly to changes in both aggregate and firm-level
Conclusion
conditions.
We also demonstrate that the Fama-French factors capture some of the systematic risk in credit spread changes. The explanatory power of the Fama-French factors seems to increase moving from high-to low-grade bonds. However, for each category of credit-risk level, the Fama-French factors virtually lose significance when combined with our proposed set of determinants, suggesting that structural model factors better capture the systematic risk in credit spread changes than do the Fama-French factors.
We develop further evidence on the viability of structural models in empirical corporate bond pricing. Building on recent innovations in asset pricing, we identify two variables -idiosyncratic volatility and the price-to-book ratio -which appear to have a strong basis in a structural model framework. Both idiosyncratic volatility and the price-to-book ratio are found to be economically and statistically significant in explaining cross sectional differences in corporate bonds, as well as in explaining the time-series variation in corporate credit spread changes. Hence, these variables should be considered along with more traditional ones in studies of bond-level credit risk.
All these findings are robust to liquidity considerations. In particular, we show that changes in the overall bond market liquidity due to Federal Reserve tightening and easing cycles do not affect the documented support for structural models. Moreover, the liquidity effects of Fed cycles are only significant in the highest-grade tercile, reinforcing the idea that investors perceive high-grade bonds as providing substitutes to Treasuries.
Appendix Effect of Portfolio Grouping on Principal Component Analysis
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate, through simulation, that aggregating single securities into portfolios, especially a small number of portfolios, could inflate the explanatory power of the first principal component. In particular, we consider the limiting case where the individual series do not share any common variation.
Consequently, we generate 2,375 i.i.d. standard normal random series of length 149 observations each, i.e. corresponding to the dimensions of our data, which contains 2,375 corporate bonds and, at most, 149 observations per bond. Then, we group the individual series to portfolios, whose number ranges between 2 and 100, based on the realized standard deviation of the individual series. (Of course, the population standard deviation is unity.) Next, PC analysis is applied to each of the resulting portfolios.
We repeat this procedure multiple times. The simulation results are presented here merely as a cautionary note; when PC analysis is applied to portfolios the apparent common variation could be artificially inflated. Still, we believe that PC analysis is useful for comparison of variations of the total spreads and the unexplained residuals when an equal number of portfolios is used to aggregate spreads and residuals. In addition, the simulation study helps explain why the first latent factor in the residuals presented in Figure 4 , although not prominently different from the remaining components, is still not small enough to conclude that no common variation exists in the residuals. The fact that it does not stand out relative
to the remaining principal components shows that the first principal component does not dominate the unexplained variation. rating (1=AAA,..., 8=BBB+,..., 17=CCC+,..., 25=D) for the bonds that do have a credit rating. S&P rating below (above) BBB is considered to be investment (non-investment) grade.
Statistic
All The table presents correlations between changes in aggregate credit spreads and changes in treasury yields. The credit spread is computed in Datastream as the bond's yield differential with the corresponding Treasury. The credit spread index used here is computed as the equal-weighted average credit spread across all 2,375 US corporate bonds. The treasury yields are represented by the two-, five-, ten-, and thirty-year treasury yield indexes provided by Merrill Lynch. Correlations are calculated based on changes in end-of-month yield data from September 1990 to January 2003.
Changes in
Changes The table reports the average coefficients and the corresponding t-ratios in the cross-sectional regressions of bond-level credit spread changes unexplained by common variation on firm-level attributes. Specifically, we first estimate factor sensitivities using the time-series regressions ∆S it = α i + β i F t + it , where ∆S it is the change in credit spread from time t-1 to time t, F t is a 3 × 1 vector of the Fama and French (1993) factors (Panel A) or a 5 × 1 vector the common structural model factors (listed in Table 5 column M1) (Panel B) realized at time t, and β i is the vector of factor loadings. Next, we run cross-sectional regressions of spread changes unexplained by the common factors on firm-level characteristics ∆S * it = a t + b t C it + e it where ∆S * it ≡ ∆S it − β i F t = α i + it , α i and β i are the coefficients estimated form the time-series regressions, and C it is the vector of firm attributes. Here is the list of attributes: stock return is the monthly equity return of the bond's issuing firm; stock momentum is the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning of the previous month; idiosyncratic volatility is the difference between the realized volatility of the stock's daily returns and the volatility of the market's daily returns over the month; and price-to-book is the ratio of the issuing firm's market price of equity divided by its book value. Reported are the coefficients from the cross-sectional regressions first including all bonds (first row) and then excluding bonds with less than two years to maturity (second row). The sample t-statistics are reported in parenthesis with 5% significance level presented in bold. 
where C ijt denotes the j'th attribute of firm i at time t: stock return is the monthly equity return of the bond's issuing firm; stock momentum is the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning of the previous month; idiosyncratic volatility is the difference between the realized volatility of the stock's daily returns and the volatility of the market's daily returns over the month; and price-to-book is the ratio of the issuing firm's market price of equity divided by its book value. T-statistics indicating 5% significance level are presented in bold. The table reports average regression coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R-squared, of time-series regressions of credit spread changes on select common factors and firm-level characteristics:
∆Spread it = a i + β 1i F t + β 2i C it + it M1: Regression on common factors, F t . M2: Regression on firm-level characteristics, C it . M3: Regression on common factors and firm-level characteristics. M4: Regression on the market (MKT), size (SMB), and value (HML) factors. M5: Regression on all variables. T-statistics indicating 5% level of significance are presented in bold. The sample period is September 1990 to January 2003. NOTE: Stock return is the monthly equity return of the bond's issuing firm; stock momentum is the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning of the previous month; idiosyncratic volatility is the difference between the realized volatility of the stock's daily returns and the volatility of the market's daily returns over the month; and price-to-book is the ratio of the issuing firm's market price of equity divided by its book value. The figure summarizes principal components of credit spread changes (first column) and regression residuals (second column). The first row is based on times-series regressions of credit spread changes on common factors described in Table 5 column M1. The second row is based on the regressions of credit spread changes on both common factors and firm-level characteristics described in Table 5 column M3. Principal component analysis is based on 35 portfolios formed by grouping the entire sample of 2,375 US corporate bonds into 5 average spread and 7 life-to-maturity categories. The bars represent the percentage of common variation explained by each of the first 5 principal components. Table 6 . The first row presents PC analysis of spread changes and residuals of low credit risk bonds (lowest tercile), while the second row presents results from bonds with high credit risk (highest tercile). Since there are fewer bonds (405 in the low credit risk group and 475 in the high credit risk group) than that in Figure 4 , principal component analysis is based on 15 portfolios formed based on 5 average spread and 3 life-to-maturity categories. The bars represent the percentage of common variation explained by each of the first 5 principal components. 
